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LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF CRIME: THE
FLORIDA CRIMES COMPENSATION ACT
LESLEY J. FRIEDSAM*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, Florida became the thirty-fourth state' to pass legislation compensating victims of violent crimes.' Florida's Crimes
Compensation Act (the Act)3 was the result of a growing awareness
by lawmakers that criminal defendants have been increasingly afforded substantial protective rights 4 while victims have been left
with little or nothing to alleviate their injuries.
This article will provide an overview of the Act and examine in
detail two controversial exclusionary provisions: the requirement
that claimants must suffer serious financial hardship in order to
receive compensation,' and the mandated exclusion of a class of
*J.D., with high honors, Florida State University College of Law, 1982; LL.M., Yale Law
School, 1983; Associate, Pajcic Pajcic Dale & Bald, Jacksonville, Florida. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professors Daniel Freed, Yale Law School, and Kenneth Vinson, Florida State University College of Law, in preparing this article.
1. For a list of states which compensate victims of crime, see Comment, The 1981
Oklahoma Crime Victim Compensation Act, 17 TULSA L.J. 260, 261-62 n.11 (1981). Thirtyeight states and the District of Columbia currently have programs which compensate victims of crime. 1982 BURAU OF CRIMES COMPENSATION ANN. REP. 10-13 [hereinafter cited as
1982 ANN. REP.].

2. The Florida Act does not compensate for property losses. A survey of 27 compensation programs showed that none gave awards for property loss. Hoelzel, A Survey of 27
Victim Compensation Programs,63 JUDICATURE 485 (1980).
3. Ch. 77-452, 1977 Fla. Laws 1819 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 960.01-.28
(1981 & Supp. 1982)).
4. "Priorities which devote millions to convicted criminals, and only thousands to innocent victims, must be re-examined and rejected." Younger, Commendable Words: A Critical
Evaluation of California's Victim Compensation Law, 7 J. BEy. HILLS B.A. 12, 15 (Mar./
Apr. 1973).
For instance, a woman is struck down by a robber on the city street; her assailant,
when apprehended and convicted, is sent to prison where he is fed, housed,

clothed, given necessary medical attention, provided with a vocation or a college
education-all at state expense. The victimized woman, however, must bear any
hospital and other expenses on her own and may suffer additional economic hardship from the temporary or even permanent loss of employment.
Haas, An Argument for the Enactment of Criminal Victim Compensation Legislation in
Oregon, 10 WILLAMETrTE L.J. 185, 186 (1974).

5.

FLA. STAT. § 960.13(7) (1981). The statute reads:
If the division finds that the claimant, if not granted assistance pursuant to this
chapter to meet the loss of earnings or support or out-of-pocket loss, will not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the loss of earnings or support and the
out-of-pocket loss incurred as a result of the injury, the division shall deny the
award.
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claimants based on their relationship with the criminal offender."
This article will begin with a brief look at the origins of compensation legislation and its underlying rationales. Next, the article
will consider traditional remedies available to crime victims-restitution, civil remedy in tort, and private insurance-to
demonstrate both the necessity for the Act and to explore its relationship to traditional avenues of victim redress. Following this
discussion, the article will give a brief overview of the Act before
commencing an examination of its exclusion provisions. This article will both raise questions about the Act's problematic exclusions
and suggest improvements.
A.

Historical Origins

Concern for crime victims is not new and has been found to be
most evident during periods of heightened criminal activity.7
Often, heinous offenses have served as catalysts increasing public
awareness of the catastrophic effects of criminal activity on innocent people.8
Predating contemporary interest is a wealth of literature
stressing the cross-cultural and religious origins of compensating
crime victims. Indemnification of the victim by the offender or his
family was a foundation of primitive and early western law.9 Perhaps the most frequently cited authority for current efforts by government to compensate crime victims is the 1775 B.C. Code of
Hammurabi of ancient Babylonia:
If the robber is not caught, the man who has been robbed shall
formally declare whatever he has lost before a god, and the city
and the mayor in whose territory or district the robbery has been
committed shall replace whatever he has lost for him.
If [it is] the life [of the owner that is lost], the city or the
6. FLA. STAT. § 960.04 (1981) excludes from compensation awards: those who are "related
within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the person who committed the crime,"
excepting dependent children "of a deceased victim of a crime who is related to or residing
in the same household as the person who committed the crime;" those who are "maintaining
a sexual relationship with the person who committed the crime;" and those who reside "in
the same household as the person who committed the crime." The statute also excludes
those who "aided in the commission of the crime," or "committed" the crime, or were "engaged in an unlawful activity at the time of the crime upon which the claim is based."
7.

H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEis, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS oF CRIM 21 (1974).

8. For example, the 1965 fatal stabbing of a 28-year-old "Good Samaritan" in New York
provided the major motivation leading to the passage of New York's statute to compensate
victims of violent crime. Id. at 21-24.
9. Schafer, Victim Compensation and Responsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. Ray. 55 (1970).
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mayor shall pay one maneh of silver to his kinsfolk.1"

This early emphasis on victim compensation gradually changed.
Modern commentators have provided numerous perspectives on
the evolution of victim compensation throughout history, which led
to monopolization of criminal redress by the state." Wrongful acts

were classified as offenses against the public, and the state became
12

interested only in punishing and rehabilitating the offender.
Eventually, the victim's only remedy for individual injuries was a
civil action in tort against the offender."3
Dissatisfied with this result and encouraged by public interest
groups,14 a number of jurisdictions began to direct their attention
to crime victims. In 1964, New Zealand became the first jurisdiction in modern times to establish a special program for compensating crime victims. 5 In 1965, California became the first state to
enact a crimes compensation statute." New York quickly followed
in 1966.17
B.

Theoretical Justifications

Commentators have advanced three rationales to justify government programs compensating crime victims. These are: the social
contract/failure to protect theory, the shared risk/insurance theory,
and the social welfare/moral obligation theory.18 Increased cooper10. Lamborn, The Methods of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1971
U. ILL. L.F. 655, 656 (quoting G. DRvER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 21 (1955)).
11. "When the criminal law abandoned its early reliance on compensatory and restitutionary justice, it also abandoned the individual victim for all practical purposes." Edelletz
[sic,] Geis, Chappell & Sulton [sic,] Part I-Public Compensation of Victims of Crime: A
Survey of the New York Experience, 9 Cimi. L. BULL. 5, 6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Edelhertz-Part I]; Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and an
Analysis of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71, 75 (1970). "When the king or
overlord began to take their share of the victim's compensation, however, the focus of the
proceedings shifted from the victim to the criminal." Id. at 75-76.
12. "Gradually the view prevailed that crime was an injury against society rather than
against one individual. Criminal law became exclusively concerned with the offender and his
offense, and the victim was left to pursue his own remedy through the civil courts." Wasik,
The Place of Compensation in the Penal System, 1978 Cmu. L. REv. 599, 600.
13. H. EDELHErTZ & G. Gins, supra note 7, at 8.
14. Lamborn, supra note 10, at 656-57. "Not until 1957, however, when British social
reformer Margery Fry became incensed because court-ordered restitution by two criminals
would fully indemnify the victim only if he survived another 442 years, was current interest
focused on governmental compensation." Id. at 656.
15. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEls, supra note 7, at 11.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 13.
18. See Note, Pending Crime Victim Compensation Legislation in Iowa: An Analysis,
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ation with law enforcement officials by victims,1 ' compensating
Good Samaritans,'20 elimination of victim alienation, 2 and deferring to politics-that compensation statutes are what the people
want22 -are also reasons that have been advanced to justify compensation acts. However, upon closer examination, these last four
appear to be simply "additional benefits of such legislation, not
underlying justifications.'
1.

Social Contract/Failureto Protect

This theory is premised on the acknowledged responsibility of
the state to protect its citizens from crime.2 4 Additionally, this theory notes that states impose restrictions on victims which prevent
them from seeking retribution by taking the law into their own
hands."5 Accordingly, supporters of the social contract theory argue
that in failing to protect its citizens, and then limiting those citizens' avenues for redress, the state has breached its duty and thus
owes compensation to victims as a matter of right.2" It is understandable why this theory is unpopular with both legislators and
courts.27 Making compensation a matter of right as opposed to a
matter of grace necessitates a whole panoply of procedural rights
for claimants, rights that cost time and money to the state and to
claimants.'8
26

DRAKz L. Rzv. 838, 839 (1977); Comment, supra note 1, at 270.
19. McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in America, 8 URB.
LAw. 346, 353 (1976).

20. Id.
21. Schafer, The ProperRole of a Victim-Compensation System, 21 CRIME & DELmNQ.
45, 48 (1975).
22. Koning, Compensation for Victims of Crime-The Texas Approach, 34 Sw. L.J. 689,
699 (1981).

23.

Id.

24. See Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 487; McAdam, supra note 19, at 351; Comment, Crime
Victim Compensation: The New York Solution, 35 ALB. L. Rav. 717, 718 (1971).
25. Brooks, The Case for Creating Compensation Programs to Aid Victims of Violent
Crimes, 11 TULSA L.J. 477, 479 (1976). Additionally, it is argued that the state's obligation
also arises from the fact that laws incarcerating the criminal limit the victim's ability to
obtain civil recovery, although this argument is incongruous with the argument that the
state is at fault for not apprehending the criminal. Koning, supra note 22, at 698 n.66.
26. Comment, supra note 1, at 268.
27. See Comment, Rehabilitationof the Victims of Crime: An Overview, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
Rav. 317, 336 (1973) (a survey conducted by the author determined that all legislatures
adopting victim compensation programs through 1973 favored the social welfare theory, as
opposed to the social contract theory); see also Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 487.
28. Brooks, supra note 25, at 484.
So long as compensation is a moral right, it remains something that the state
ought to do but not something that the state has to do.... If compensation
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Critics argue that the social contract theory misplaces the blame

because it is the criminal, not the state, who is at fault for the
criminal act.2 9 It is doubtful that government can eliminate all violent crimes.3 0 Attempts to halt crimes beyond a certain level could
lead to repressive police tactics, impinging on the liberties of all
citizens.8" Also, it is tenuous to presume that particular govern-

ment defaults caused each victimization."2
2. Shared Risk/Insurance

This theory, analogous to an insurance plan, is the second rationale upon which victim compensation plans might be based. It
suggests that citizens' taxes be used as premiums for compensation
programs. as Thus tax dollar contributions/premiums would mean
that all citizens share both in the cost and the risk of victimization."' Of course, this theory is inapplicable as a justification in
states such as Florida which do not fund their compensation programs from tax dollars.
3.

Social Welfare/Moral Obligation

The justification for compensation statutes advanced by some

states is the amorphous theory of moral obligation."8 The Florida
Act thus states:
The Legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer
personal injury or death as a direct result of criminal acts or in
their efforts to prevent crime or apprehend persons committing or
payments are awarded as a matter of grace, as contrasted to the victim having a
legal claim upon the state for compensation, then the administrative procedures,
especially appeals proceedings, can possibly be quite different.
Id. (emphasis in original).
29. Childres, Compensation for CriminallyInflicted PersonalInjury, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
444, 455 (1964). Because the criminal is at fault, to place blame on the state is to engage in a
fiction and to ignore the individual will of that criminal. Id.
30. Comment, supra note 1, at 268.
31. McAdam, supra note 19, at 352.
32. "Whether any government could. . . [halt all crimes of violence] absolutely seems
doubtful. Whether being a victim necessarily depends upon a government 'defaulting' its
obligations also seems doubtful, at least to many." Brooks, supra note 25, at 480.
33. Comment, supra note 1, at 270. Another way of looking at this theory is through a
loss-spreading analysis. Thus one commentator noted: "A state's unique ability to spread
these losses efficiently, combined with a state's general duty to provide for the public welfare, implicates a state duty to establish these programs." Koning, supra note 22, at 699.
34. Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 487-88.
35. Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 487; Comment, supra note 27, at 318.
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attempting to commit crimes. Such persons or their dependents
may thereby suffer disabilities, incur financial hardships, or become dependent upon financial assistance. The Legislature finds
and determines that there is a need for government financial assistance for such victims of crime. Accordingly, it is the intent of
the Legislature that aid, care, and support be provided by the
state, as a matter of moral responsibility, for such victims of
crime.8s
The social welfare/moral obligation theory has been soundly criticized. 87 One argument is that the theory simply lacks a legal foundation; that is, the state's power to create such a moral obligation
should not be confused with the reason for enactment.8 " Thus, the
theory does not answer the critical question of why the state's
proper function is to help crime victims, while ignoring other victims who are equally deserving such as victims of natural disasters. 9 Commentators argue this important question is not answered by simply saying "first things first. 4 0 To the contrary, the
legislative process is one of policy-making. Thus one argument for
state-funded compensation programs for crime victims as opposed
to natural disaster victims is related to the aforementioned social
contract/failure to protect theory; that is, since society creates the
conditions under which crimes are committed, society should help
compensate victims.4 1 This answer, however, does nothing but reaffirm the argument that the social welfare theory lacks a legal foundation. Yet other commentators have argued that the consequence
of operating without a theoretical foundation is problematic; justifications are necessary to insure proper handling of subsequent
considerations. 2
36. FLA. STAT. § 960.02 (1981).
37. Brooks, supra note 25, at 486-90; Koning, supra note 22, at 698-99.
38. "The social welfare theory begs the question; the state's power to provide for the
general welfare offers no explanation for the state's exercise of the power in this particular
instance." Koning, supra note 22, at 698.
39. Brooks, supra note 25, at 486-87. "Why alleviate the suffering of victims of crimes of
violence and not, for instance, that of the farmer, who while working in his field, is struck by
lightening [sic] and rendered a helpless invalid?" Id. at 487 (quoting Miller, Compensation
for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. Pun. L. 203, 204 (1959)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 487.
42. Id. at 486.
[W]ithout a prescriptive theoretical foundation, other decisions that will have to
be reached if a compensation plan is adopted may be more worrisome. Will payments be made as a matter of legal right or on an ex gratia basis? This can become very meaningful because of the necessity to accomodate the bureaucracy to a
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Another criticism of the social welfare theory is the perception
that it expands the welfare state and encourages dependence and
governmental paternalism. This suggests that it is better for a
crime victim to suffer his economic loss alone rather than risk fostering socialism through compensation programs. The validity of
this conception that a lack of government assistance will
"strengthen one's 'moral fiber' ," is doubtful.
Accordingly, it is important to consider whether a legal foundation is necessary for these compensation programs. English jurist
Rupert Cross stated:
Speaking for myself, I am content to do without theoretical justifications for compensation of victims of violence .... If there is a
widely recognized hardship, and if that hardship can be cheaply
remedied by state compensation, I should have thought that the
case for such a remedy was
made out, provided the practical diffi4
culties are not too great.'
In subscribing to the social welfare/moral responsibility theory,
the Florida Legislature has made compensation a matter of grace
instead of right, thus signaling its intent to narrow the statute's
application and winnow out classes of claimants who might either
cost too much or be otherwise politically unacceptable. The question, of course, is at what point have the restrictions and exclusions
gone too far, so that the Act becomes merely a placebo leaving the
state's elusive moral responsibility unfulfilled.
II.

ALTERNATIVES TO STATE COMPENSATION

Addressing the above question involves a brief look at the entire
Act before examining its problematic restrictions. First, however, it
is important to consider the context in which such compensation
statutes exist. There are three traditional remedies available to
crime victims-restitution, a civil remedy in tort, and private insurance. In considering these three remedies, it will be helpful to
analyze the gaps left by these standard remedies because it is these
gaps which victim compensation acts seek to fill. Further insight
can be gained by considering how the traditional remedies fit
new function.

Id.
43. Id. at 489-91.
44. Id. at 486 (quoting Cross, Compensating Victims of Violence, The Listener, May 16,
1963, at 815-17).
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within the systems which now include victim compensation.
A.

Restitution

Restitution makes the criminal responsible for helping the victim become whole again. 4 ' The appeal of restitution is that the
punishment fits the crime."' It also helps rehabilitate the criminal.4 7 But the problems with restitution are numerous. First, the
offender must be apprehended and plead guilty, nolo contendere,
or be convicted.' State compensation programs do not have these
prerequisites. 9 Second, the offender must have enough money to
pay the restitution award to the victim.50 This problem is often
insurmountable. If the offender is incarcerated, scant prison wages
are generally insufficient to provide for the offender's own family,
much less the crime victim."1 The problem in Florida is exacerbated because restitution awards to victims from jailed offenders
compete with payments to the offenders' families and/or payment
for prison room and board."2 The money problem has resulted in
restitution only being a viable remedy primarily when offenders
can be quickly returned to society through probation or parole. 8
In addition, those paroled after serving part of a sentence in prison
are resistant to paying restitution. These offenders make the same
mistake as the state by inferring that the offense was only against
the collective whole and not against the individual victim." Fi45. Laster, supra note 11, at 80. See also Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An
Old CorrectionalAim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. Rav. 243 (1965).
46. Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CaIM. L. Buu. 203, 214 (1978).
47. Brooks, supra note 25, at 491.
48. Apprehension of the offender is unlikely. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, out of 1,855,890 known offenses in 2,559 cities, the total arrest rate was only 19.7%
in 1976. FBI UNIF. CRIMz RaP. 219 (1976). Even if the offender is apprehended, he must still
be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt unless he pleads guilty or nolo contendre. W.
LAFAVE, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW

16 (1972).

49. Comment, supra note 27, at 337. The current Florida statute is actually silent on
that point, but a prior statute contained an express provision whereby an offender's apprehension was not required. FLA. STAT. § 960.09(3) (1977). This provision was apparently inadvertently omitted when the statute was revised in 1980.
50. McGee, Crime Victim Compensation, 5 J. CoNTEMP. L. 67, 70 (1978).
51. Brooks, supra note 25, at 493.
In New Jersey's newest and most modern prison "the budget allows only 45 to 58
cents a day, depending on the job." Striking prisoners at the New Mexico State
Penitentiary included in their list of demands the "payment of the minimum wage
($1.60 an hour) for all work done in the prison."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 944.49(2)(c) (1981).
53. Harland, supra note 46, at 216.
54. Brooks, supra note 25, at 492.
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nally, most state legislatures have eliminated restitution for violent
crimes fearing that criminals, if forced to pay compensation, might
retaliate against their victims. 5
Restitution works best in compensating for less serious offenses
involving property loss or minor personal injuries when the offender is not incarcerated." This fits in well with the void left by
compensation statutes which do not compensate property loss"7
and which require a minimum loss before an award is given."e Conversely, compensation statutes fill the gap left by restitution when
serious personal injury resulting from crime necessitates a substantial money award. Of course, restitution still involves the problems
of apprehension and conviction. There is, however, some indication
that the financial abilities of non-incarcerated offenders to make
restitution for small money losses or property losses are sufficient
to make restitution a viable complement to compensation
statutes.59
B. Civil Action in Tort
Although all victims of crime have a remedy in tort, 0 problems
of civil recovery render this option impotent.61 Many of the difficulties are identical with those discussed regarding restitution; the
offender usually escapes apprehension"' or an apprehended offender is generally judgment-proof. 6 3 If the offender has money, it
may be exhausted in defending himself in either the criminal or
55. McAdam, supra note 19, at 349.
56. Harland, supra note 46, at 216.
57. See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
58. Exactly half of the states with compensation statutes require a minimum loss ranging from $25 to $100/two weeks income. Florida has no minimum loss requirement. 1982
ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 10-13. For more about minimum loss requirements, see infra
note 169.
59. Harland, supra note 46, at 216-22. After a thorough examination of the 1974 FBI
Uniform Crime Report, Harland concludes that losses for offenses of non-violent crimes not
involving vehicles are less than $100 for 73% of the victims; additionally, for vehicle theft,
after recovery by police, insurance, and other sources is taken into account, the author concludes that only 8% of those victimizations involve losses of more than $250. Id. It must be
noted that restitution programs have other problems in enforcement and administration
through the courts and parole and probation commissions. See Chesney, Hudson &
McLagen, A New Look at Restitution:Recent Legislation, Programsand Research, 61 JuDicATuRz 348 (1978); Hudson, Galaway, & Chesney, When CriminalsRepay Their Victims: A
Survey of Restitution Programs, 60 JuDIcATURE 313 (1977).
60. McAdam, supra note 19, at 347-48.
61. Lamborn, Remedies for the Victims of Crime, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 22, 24 (1970).
62. Brooks, supra note 25, at 480.
63. Lamborn, supra note 61, at 38.
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civil case. 4 Additionally, even when the offender has assets, it may
be difficult to introduce a criminal conviction into evidence in a
civil case. 6 5 Accordingly, only a small percentage of victims ever
recover civil awards from their assailant."
The civil action does fill a gap left by compensation statutes.
Most programs do not compensate pain and suffering, 7 and have a
maximum award.6 8 Thus, only for those victims fortunate enough
to be victimized by a solvent defendant does a civil remedy provide
some supplemental relief.
C.

Private Insurance

Those who criticize compensation plans as extensions of the welfare state argue that private individuals should have the responsibility of insuring themselves against the costs of crime. e9 This alternative, however, has been repeatedly rejected as insufficient to
provide for the majority of victims. 70 First, research indicates that
most victims live in low income districts.7 ' Insurance in these areas
is more expensive; yet those in need are less likely to have the
money to pay.7 2 Even those with insurance are generally underinsured. 78 Further, insurance coverage typically excludes payment for
injuries suffered due to the illegal or intentional act of another person.7 " Accordingly, private insurance is a poor substitute for statefunded compensation plans. Private insurance, however, does have
a place within a system that includes a state-funded compensation
64.

Brooks, supra note 25, at 481.

65. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 276 (1979).
66. D. MULVIHILL & M. TUMIN, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 801 (1969). Moreover, it must be
noted that a civil action puts additional demands on the victim who must go through the
anxiety of two processes-the criminal case and a civil proceeding. Brooks, supra note 25, at
481.
67. Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 492.
68. Only New York has no maximum award in medical expenses. Other states' maximum
awards range from $1500 to $50,000, covering both loss of earnings and medical benefits.
1982 ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 10-13.
69. McAdam, supra note 19, at 348.
70. Brooks, supra note 25, at 500; Comment, supra note 24, at 719-22; Note, supra note
18, at 841.
71. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 20, 25-77 (1977); Comment, supra note 27, at
330.
72. Comment, supra note 27, at 330.
73. Haas, supra note 4, at 196.
74. Starrs, A Modest Proposal to Insure Justice for Victims of Crime, 50 MINN. L. REV.
285, 301-02 (1965).
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plan; those who can afford insurance may protect against property
losses which are not covered by the statute or which may not be
recoverable through restitution.
In summary, these three traditional victim remedies"' are, by
themselves, inadequate to provide meaningful recovery for crime
victims. However, the gaps left by these remedies can be filled by
compensation statutes. Conversely, it is possible that gaps in com-

pensation statutes can be filled by these remedies.
III.

AN

OVERVIEW OF THE FLORIDA CRIMES COMPENSATION ACT

A hybrid of existing state plans and the Uniform Crime Victims
Reparations Act (UCVRA),7 the Florida legislation was enacted a
few years after the legislature first passed a series of laws to aid
crime victims. 7 7 Although the Act was passed in 1977, the law's application was, because of special funding provisions discussed here7
inafter, limited to victims injured on or after January 1, 1978. 1
The compensation program is administered by the Bureau of
Crimes Compensation (BCC) located within the Division of Workers' Compensation of the Department of Labor and Employment
Security.7 9 Although the threshold eligibility requirements are eas75. Another suggested remedy for victims is to spe the state for its failure to provide
adequate protection. This remedy, however, has been criticized as unworkable due to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Note, Compensating Victims of Crime: Evolving Concept or Dying Theory?, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 89, 91-92 (1979); see also McGee, supra note 50,
at 70-71.
76. This Act was adopted in North Dakota and Ohio and represents the efforts of the
Uniform State Law Commissioners to come to grips with the difficult issues of crime victim
compensation.
77. In 1976, lawmakers enacted a statute requiring that victims have the right to tell
their story of the crime and resulting loss or injury to the sentencing judge when the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere. See FA. STAT. § 921.143 (1981). Also in 1976 the
legislature amended the prison work program so that prison money earned could be used to
satisfy court-ordered restitution awards to victims. See FLA. STAT. § 944.49(2)(b) (1981). In
1977, the lawmakers passed a statute that puts a lien on money earned by convicted felons
from the sale of book and movie rights concerning their crimes. See FLA. STAT. § 944.512
(1981). The legislature also extended the conditions under which victim restitution is ordered. Under pre-1977 law, the court could make restitution only as a condition of probation. The new enactment allows the Parole and Probation Commission to require reparation
or restitution as a condition of parole. FLA. STAT. § 947.181 (1981).
78. According to 1978 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 22, rendered February 21, 1978, the
application of the law was limited to victims injured on or after January 1, 1978. This opinion was upheld in Jackson v. Florida Crimes Compensation Comm., 372 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1979).
79. FLA. STAT. § 960.05 (1981). Originally, the Act was administered through a threeperson Crimes Compensation Commission operating as an independent department'within
the state Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The legislature abolished the
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ily achieved, a number of restrictions and qualifications limit both
numbers and classes of claimants. The first requirement for eligibility is a finding by the BCC that a crime was committed."s The
Act requires that this crime be reported within seventy-two hours
after it was committed unless a good cause for delay exists."1 Additionally, the Act requires that claimants duly cooperate with all
law enforcement officials. The penalty for noncooperation may be
denial, reduction, or withdrawal of any award. 82
The Act further requires that the victim be a Florida resident
and that the crime have occurred within the state s The Act provides that the following are. eligible to receive awards: victims, intervenors, surviving parents or children, a spouse of a dead victim
or intervenor, other persons who are dependent for principal support from a dead victim or intervenor, and a dependent child of a
dead victim who is related to or residing in the same household as
the criminal offender. 8 ' A victim is defined as a person who suffers
personal physical injury or death as a direct result of the crime,
and intervenors are persons who are 5injured or killed as a direct
8
result of going to the aid of another.
Excluded from eligibility are the criminal offender, persons aiding .the offender in committing the crime, persons engaging in unlawful activity when the crime was committed and anyone impermissibly related to the criminal offender as defined by statute."
This broad category of exclusions will be examined in greater detail in a later portion of this article.
Although the maximum possible award is $10,000, the Act requires no minimum loss.87 Awards can be reduced under certain
Commission in 1980 and moved its functions to the Department of Labor and Employment
Security.
80. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(1)(a)(1) (1981). Although some states have designated crimes for
which compensation may be had, Florida uses a generic definition so that the commission of
any misdemeanor or felony may mean compensation for the victim.
81. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(1)(b) (1981). The crime must be reported "to the proper authorities." FLA STAT. § 960.13(1)(a)(3) (1981).
82. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(1)(b) (1981). Unfortunately, the statute does nothing to define
what the required cooperation entails. It is thus unclear whether the victim/claimant must
appear at every lineup, hearing, trial date, etc., in order to be given a full award. Also, the
case examples given in the BCC's annual report which show an award reduction make no
mention of what administrative criteria were used to determine the meaning of cooperation.

83.

FLA. STAT.

§ 960.03(3) (1981).

84. FLA. STAT. § 960.04(1)(a)-(e) (1981).
85. FLA. STAT. § 960.03(6)-(7) (1981).
86. FLA. STAT. § 960.04(2)(a)-(e) (1981).
87. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(8) (1981). For more about minimum loss requirements, see infra
note 170. The statute also allows for emergency awards of up to $500, with this award de-
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circumstances"8 and are only granted on an "actual need" basis after insurance and workers' compensation benefits have been deducted. 9 Significantly, awards will be denied if the claimant will
not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of both the loss of
earnings or support and the out-of-pocket loss incurred as a result
of the injury.90 The financial needs test will be explored in detail
following this overview.
The Act's funding provisions are especially interesting. While
most states fund their compensation plans with tax dollars, 91 Florida has chosen a multitude of funding elements: an added $15
court cost for any case where the defendant pleads guilty or nolo
contendere or is convicted of a crime; 92 a five percent surcharge on
all criminal fines and bail bonds; 93 the creation of an additional
major fine of up to $10,000 which the court may impose on offenders;94 and the subrogation to the state, after payment of an award,
of any cause of action accruing to a claimant, victim, or intervenor
to recover losses resulting from the crime for which the award was
made.95 Importantly, awards paid to claimants are considered
debts owed to the state by the criminal offender. Thus, restitutionary repayment to the state may be considered by the court as a
condition of probation or by the Parole and Probation Commission
as a condition of parole." Finally, the Florida program may receive
ducted from the final amount of money paid. FLA. STAT. § 960.12(1)-(2) (1981).
88. Awards can be reduced because of failure to cooperate with law enforcement officials.
FLA. STAT. § 960.13(1)(b) (1981). Additionally, awards can be reduced if the victim or intervenor contributed to his own injury. In the case of an intervenor, a reduction is made only if
the intervenor has acted recklessly. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(6) (1981).

89.

FLA. STAT.

§ 960.13(2) (1981).

90. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(7) (1981). Awards for medical bills are paid directly to medical
providers. FLA. STAT. § 960.14(1) (1981).
91. Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 492. This approach has been criticized, however, because of
its implicit extension of a welfare character to the compensation program and the difficulty
of assuring a consistent funding base for future needs.
92. Ch. 83-319, § 3, 1983 Fla. Laws (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 960.20). Previously,
under the now-repealed FLA. STAT. § 960.19 (1979), the added court cost was discretionary.
The added court cost has withstood judicial challenge. In State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874
(Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court held that the statute which allowed a $10 added
court cost in criminal prosecutions was constitutional. This method of funding is a relatively
recent development, but one commentator has suggested that "[i]t is. . . an illusion to look
to criminal fines, or subrogation, as a substantial source for financing reparations to crime
victims." H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 7, at 290. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such funding provisions, see Koning, supra note 22, at 697 n.59.
93. FLA. STAT. § 960.25 (Supp. 1982).
94. FLA. STAT. § 775.0835(1) (1981).

95.
96.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 960.16 (1981).
§ 960.17 (1981).
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money from a federal agency participating in a cooperative crime
compensation plan if Congress enacts legislation to provide for
such a program."
The Act, by making awards paid to victims a debt owed by the
offender, meets a major criticism of compensation statutes-that
such state payments do nothing to rehabilitate or punish the offender.9 8 Additionally, this provision suggests an ordering system
be used when both compensation and restitution are available as
remedies, i.e., compensating the victim first, followed by restitution to the state by the offender."" This order allows the victim to
be compensated more quickly than is possible with a scheme of
restitution only. 10 0 This same scheme, however, contains a disadvantage; with the victim compensated and thus out of the picture,
it is questionable whether the state will actively pursue the debt
owed by the offender.
This debt repayment provision has also been challenged as a
deprivation of due process. 101 Because the debt to the state is created automatically when the victim receives an award, the offender
has no notice or opportunity to contest the amount. This procedural dilemma can be solved by amending the Act so that victim
awards may be considered a debt owed by the offender with the
97. FLA. STAT. § 960.22 (1981). For a thorough discussion of the heretofore unsuccessful*
efforts to provide federal money to compensate crime victims, see H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS,
supra note 7, at 191-212. The proceeds of all of these collections are then earmarked to be
paid into the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund which is administered by the BCC. FLA.
STAT. § 960.21 (1981). Since the program began over five years ago, the trust fund has averaged receipt of nearly two million dollars per year. 1982 ANN REP., supra note 1, at 21; 1981
FLA. BUREAU OF CRIMES COMPENSATION ANN. REP. 20-21.
98. Brooks, supra note 25, at 491-92.
99. This victim-first ordering makes the most sense if the victim has suffered financial
hardship as a result of the crime. But this ordering also has equal merit should the financial
hardship test be eliminated. For example, it seems absurd to deplete a family's assets for
their child's upcoming college tuition with the promise of compensation through small
amounts of restitution spread over the years when a state compensation award can pay the
victim quickly. Accordingly, even victims with seemingly liquid assets can be just as much in
need of quick replacement of their losses as their neighbors without savings who, without
quick repayment, would suffer different consequences.
100. The length of time to process a claim under the Act "varies from one to six months,
and sometimes even longer depending upon the cooperativeness of the applicant, the complexity of the applicant's financial resources and insurance benefits, and the disability and
recovery period of the victim." 1982 ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 5. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the Act allows for emergency awards of up to $500. FLA. STAT. § 960.12
(1981). Conversely, restitutionary awards must wait until an offender is convicted or even
until a later time such as parole.
101. In Champe, 373 So. 2d at 877, the Florida Supreme Court declined to rule on the
due process question because the petitioner was not subject to the reimbursement
provisions.
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amount., if any, to be determined at whatever hearing is afforded
the offender under regular restitution circumstances.10 2
The claims process in Florida begins when the BCC receives an
application within one year after the crime occurred. 103 In order
not to prejudice a criminal defendant, the state attorney may request that the BCC defer action until after the criminal case is
resolved. 1 4 Claims which survive an initial screening105 are referred
to an assigned field investigator who then makes a recommendation to the Bureau Chief. 1 6 Claimants who disagree with the Bureau Chief's
decision have sixty days in which to begin the appeals
07
process.1

Before examining the two major exclusions of the Act, it is important to note that all compensation statutes disallow property
loss.108 The importance to victims of this exclusion cannot be underestimated. According to a recent index of offenses by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), ninety-one percent of all offenses were property crimes. 109 These victims, therefore, are
excluded from state compensation.
102. For a thorough examination of the procedural aspects of restitution, see Goldstein,
Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 544-47 (1982).
103. FLA. STAT. § 960.07(2) (1981). If a claimant shows good cause for delay, the Bureau
may extend the filing time for a total period of up to two years. Id.
104. FLA. STAT. § 960.07(4) (1981). An offender could be prejudiced because "[ilmplicit
in each award . . . is [a] . . . finding that someone committed a crime." H, EDELHERTZ & G.
GE s, supra note 7, at 261. While this presents no problem if the offender has not been
apprehended, one charged with a crime may have a substantial interest in the compensation
process because the award determination could stigmatize the offender before trial. Id. Offenders, however, may be apprehended long after the one to six-month claims processing
period has elapsed so that an award has already been made. All of this suggests that the
impact of crimes compensation statutes on criminal justice has yet to be thoroughly
examined.
105. After the law enforcement information is received, the BCC eliminates those claimants who fail to meet the statutory criteria of filing within the requisite period and reporting
the crime to the proper authorities. 1982 ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 5. After the initial
screening, the field investigator determines the more difficult issues of victim provocation
and serious financial hardship. Claimants who are impermissibly related to the offender or
those who were not injured by a crime are eliminated before the field investigator begins his
work. Id.
106. Id.
107. FLA. STAT. § 960.09 (1981). The first appeal available to a claimant is the submission of additional evidence to the Bureau Chief. Should this prove unsuccessful, the claimant may next appeal to the Deputy Commissioner for Workers' Compensation who then
conducts hearings in accordance with the statutory requirements for workers' compensation
claims. Finally, actions by the Deputy Commissioner may be appealed to the First District
Court of Appeal. Id.
108. See supra note 2.
109. FBI UNIF. ClIME REP., supra note 48, at 36.
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In looking at those rationales which are advanced to justify compensation plans, the exclusion makes no sense. 110 Although some
commentators justified the property exclusion because "most property lost or damaged through crime is recovered,""' recent FBI
statistics show a contrary result. 11 A further argument advanced is
that property losses are more often insured. 1" Yet this analysis has
the same flaw as the argument that private insurance can be a substitute for state compensation plans; those least likely to be insured are those most likely to be property crime victims."" Additionally, some commentators argue that compensating the great
number of property loss victims would simply be too costly, 115
while others claim the property loss exclusion prevents fraudulent
claims. 16
But there is more. There is the belief that property losses are
not as serious as personal injuries" 17 and that they lack social impact. s This argument only makes sense if one believes the criticism that compensation plans operate mostly as placebos or political gestures. 19 Accordingly, although the argument for
compensating crime victims for property loss is as strong as that
for providing awards for personal injuries, it is difficult politically
to see how legislators will fund property losses before remedying
110. For example, if a victim has a "right" to compensation or even if the state owes
only a moral responsibility to a victim, why should that right or responsibility stop when
property crimes are involved?
111. Childres, Compensationfor Criminally Inflicted PersonalInjury, 50 M1NhN. L. Rlv.
271, 272 (1965).
112. Recent FBI statistics consistently show very low recovery rates for all types of stolen property except automobiles. Harland, supra note 46, at 208-19.
113. Childres, supra note 111, at 272.
114. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
115. The argument here is that although individual losses might be slight, there are simply too many losses.
116.
McAdam, supra note 19, at 357. The author writes that it is easy to identify personal injuries, unlike property losses where the victim could double or triple the amount of
claimed cash or goods lost. Id. For a contrary view, see Harland, supra note 46, at 209. The
author notes that the argument "that compensation for property losses would invite fraudulent claims says little about those victims who can clearly document bona fide losses." Id.
117. Harland, supra note 46, at 209.
118. Childres, supra note 111, at 272.
119. Harland, supra note 46, at 222-24.
Because victimization is such an infrequent occurrence, what is actually done for
victims becomes less important politically than creating the general impression
that something is being done. As long as a majority of the public thinks it will be
adequately compensated if victimized, proportionally so few will ever have to test
such a belief that it need not necessarily be founded upon a realistic ... program.
Id. at 223 (footnotes omitted).
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the more demanding omissions in coverage of personal injuries.'

While the Act's declaration of policy and intent grandly states
that its purpose is to meet the state's moral obligation to aid innocent victims,' 2 ' two major restrictions within the statute contravene that intent. One restriction mandates claim denial unless the
victim/claimant/intervenor would suffer a serious financial hardship.12 2 The other denies awards when the victim/claimant is impermissibly related to the criminal offender. 23 Because these two
exclusions are broad, they impact both on numbers and classes of
potential claimants. As will be shown in the upcoming analysis,

these statutory limitations have the effect of undermining the Act's
effectiveness and purpose. The criticism of two commentators is
especially appropriate:
It is not unduly harsh to say that compensation programs
emerged out of a desire to "do good" but to do so at the lowest
possible price. From the seeds of some rather noble and encompassing justifications, therefore, legislatures have carefully pruned
emergent programs with restrictive clauses that carefully stipulate to whom, under what circumstances, and in conformity with
what conditions an award might be made.""
Accordingly, it is appropriate to examine these restrictions in light
of the reasons offered for their support and the detrimental effects
which may result.

IV.

FINANCIAL NEED REQUIREMENT

Currently, fourteen other states join Florida in requiring claimants to show financial need in varying amounts in order to be eligi120.
121.

H.

EDELHERTZ & G. GIs, supra note 7, at 283.
FLA. STAT. § 960.02 (1981).

122.

FLA. STAT.

§ 960.13(7) (1981). The statute reads: "If the division finds that the

claimant, if not granted assistance pursuant to this chapter to meet the loss of earnings or
support or out-of-pocket loss, will not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the loss
of earnings or support. . . the division shall deny the award." Id.
123. FLA. STAT. § 960.04(2)(a)-(e) (1981). Excluded are those who committed the crime
or aided in the commission of the crime upon which the claim was based, those who were
engaged in unlawful activity at the time the crime was committed, those who are related
within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the offender (with an exception for
dependent children of a deceased crime victim who was related to or residing in the same
household as the person who committed the crime), those who are maintaining a sexual
relationship with the offender, and those who reside in the same household as the person
who committed the crime. Id.
124. J. GAROFALO & L. SurrON, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME: POTENTIAL COSTS AND
COVERAGE OF A NATIONAL PROGRAM 13 (1977).
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ble for awards." 5 The Florida Act requires that claims be denied
by the BCC unless the denial results in "serious financial hardship" to the claimant.""6 The Act then instructs the BCC to consider "all the financial resources of the claimant" in determining
whether the hardship test is met.127 The implementing rules, however, modify that harsh standard only slightly.'
The predominant rationale for requiring actual need or serious
financial hardship as a prerequisite for an award is that of cost
efficiency; that is, it is assumed that the need requirement will
limit the number of awards granted and thus insure compensation
for the neediest victims. 2 9 Legislators, aware of potential budget
ramifications of legislation, are proponents of the financial hardship test. 80 Commentators and program administrators, however,
rarely favor such requirements;' 3 ' instead, many ardently oppose
13
such restrictions.
Is the legislative cost-saving rationale correct? One must first examine the administrative costs inherent in determining eligibility
on the basis of financial need. In Florida, the machinery for determining such eligibility does not come into play until well into the
investigatory process. 83 Officials necessarily spend time and therefore a considerable amount of money examining a claimant's
financial records and checking information with employers, insur-

ance carriers, banks, and other sources.'" It is arguable, therefore,
125. 1982 ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 10-13. Most states label the requirement "serious
financial hardship." Oklahoma calls for "economic loss," while Oregon labels its requirement
"extreme hardship." Id.
126. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(7) (1981).
127. Id.
128. The implementing rules state that the claimant's financial resources shall be determined without reference to homestead, personal property, family cars, and tools or equipment needed in the claimant's profession, trade or business. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10L6.01(3) (1982).
129. Note, Virginia Adopts Statute to Compensate the Victims of Crime, 11 U. RICH. L.
Rzv. 679, 682 (1977).
130. H. EDELHERTZ & G. Gins, supra note 7, at 31-35.
131. In an opinion survey taken of eighteen administrators of compensation programs,
only three felt that the victim's need should be a prerequisite for making an award. Brooks,
Compensating Victims of Crime: The Recommendations of Program Administrators,7 L. &
Soc'y REv. 445, 464 (1973).
132. See, e.g., H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 7, at 271; Lamborn, The Scope of
Programsfor Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 21, 55-57.
133. 1982 ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 5. After the application form is received, information is requested from the state attorney, law enforcement officials, and medical providers.
Id.
134. Comment, New York Crime Victims Compensation Board Act: Four Years Later, 7
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 25, 31 (1971).
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that any savings coming from the financial hardship requirement
are vastly overrated because the costs of administering the requirement are among the highest of the entire investigation.1 38
There is a second factor that must be considered in evaluating
any cost saving effect of the financial hardship test: abandonment
of the collateral source rule.'3 6 The Act operates so that actual
need is determined after benefits provided by workers' compensation, health, accident, automobile, and life insurance have been
awarded, thus preventing a "double recovery. 1 37 People with insurance benefits are often the same persons who are excluded by
the financial hardship test. 88 Thus, elimination of this requirement would not add this group of claimants to the eligibility roster
because the Act eliminates them on these other grounds. 3 9 Also,
wealthier claimants might be less likely to go through the intrusive
compensation process to recover relatively small losses.1 40 Arguably, the savings to be achieved through the financial hardship test,
therefore, have been greatly overestimated.' 41 Due to increased administrative costs and the fact that large numbers of those now
excluded by the financial hardship test would not be added to the
list of claimants because their insurance coverage would exclude
them, fiscal benefits of the financial hardship test are small. 4 2 On
the basis of these considerations, the New York program's chief
investigator estimated that eliminating the financial hardship requirement would add only ten percent to the cost of the program.' 43 Assuming, however, that this ten percent or a higher
amount of money can be saved by keeping this restriction, does the
savings equal or exceed the human costs?
There is a serious problem in requiring claimants, having already
been victimized, to bare their financial souls by submitting private
financial data to administrators. The financial examination is
demeaning14 4 and makes the victim feel that he or she is on trial
135. H. EDELHERTZ & G. Gris, supra note 7, at 271-72.
136. The collateral source rule allows claimants to recover from both private insurance
and those responsible for their injury. W. PaossEn, THE LAw OF ToRTs 547-53 (4th ed.
1971).

137.

FLA. STAT.

§ 960.13(2) (1981).

138. Geis & Edelhertz, California's New Crime Victim Compensation Statute, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 880, 904 (1974).

139.

FLA. STAT.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Geis & Edelhertz, supra note 138, at 904.
Koning, supra note 22, at 703.
Id.
H. EDELHERTZ & G. Gins, supra note 7, at 59.
Id. at 272.

§ 960.13(2) (1981).
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and in the uncomfortable position of proving that he or she is poor
enough to qualify for recovery. "5 A California official who determined the need status of claimants stated:
[P]eople come in again and again and say because I was frugal,
because I saved a dollar, I'm being deprived of my compensation,
whereas the man who threw the money away, or the woman who
threw it away, is going to get money from you. This story you
146
hear over and over again ....
Thus the financial hardship test leads to alienation, which state1 47
funded programs are intended to eliminate.
A more substantial problem with the financial needs test is that
it changes the focus of the program from one of crime compensation to that of welfare handout. 48 The California experience is especially instructive. When that state's compensation plan was enacted, the program was placed under the auspices of the thenexisting welfare department. That department simply used its
guidelines for determining aid to families with dependent children
as the standard for determining victim compensation awards. The
result was that attitudes formed by years of dealing with welfare
recipients were carried over to crime victims. 4 9 Commentators
condemned the placement of the California program in the welfare
department. 5 ' Accordingly, the program was later moved to an in145. Id. at 62-63 (applicant stated upon leaving the hearing: "I feel like a criminal").
146. Id. at 92.
147. Theoretically, state compensation awards should help dissipate the disillusionment
of victims who suffer, in addition to their victimization, losses of time and income incurred
as a result of their attempts to cooperate with law enforcement officials. Since some innocent victims are denied compensation because their income is not low enough, this achievement goes unrecognized. The experience of some states suggests that programs which use
financial stress tests increase victim alienation. Id. at 59.
In addition, the indignity of the financial hardship test could lead to greater hesitancy on
the part of those victimized to apply for compensation, and a corresponding decrease in
crime reporting. McAdam, supra note 19, at 356.
148. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELs, supra note 7, at 91-92. The needs requirement causes the
public to confuse compensation programs with charity, which also results in a hesitancy of
victims to apply for compensation.- McAdam, supra note 19, at 355-56.
149. Lamborn, supra note 10, at 676. The experience of the first recipient of California's
program was hardly pleasant. She was required to reveal that she had only a seventh grade
education and was pregnant at the time of her marriage. As an additional indignity she was
told by welfare workers to get a job so as not to be a burden upon the taxpayers. Id. at 67677.
150. Id. at 676. See Shank, Aid to Victims of Violent Crimes in California,43 S. CAL. L.
REv. 85, 87 (1970).
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dependent agency. 15 '
Although the Florida Legislature first put the compensation program in the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the
lawmakers later moved the program to a neutral agency.152 Thus,
at least structurally, the Florida program seems far removed from
the welfare stigma of free handouts. However, because of confusion
in the public's mind, 153 the welfare spectre remains when, as in
Florida, financial hardship is a requirement for compensation. The
Act notes this overlap when it states that one policy rationale for
compensating victims is to keep them from becoming dependent
on public support. 5 4 But one commentator noted that "welfare
programs are analogous [to compensation programs] only in that
they deal with destitution, which compensation is intended to
55
prevent."
The difference between the two programs is of critical importance. Welfare and victim compensation have different rationales,
different victims, and different social problems which they seek to
alleviate. 56 Additionally, there is no admitted causal relationship
between poverty and governmental activity. 157 Arguably, however,
such a relationship exists between governmental activity and criminal injury, as commentators have noted when justifying crimes
compensation programs on the social contract/failure to protect
1 58

theory.

The drafters of the UCVRA noted the danger of transforming
victim compensation into a welfare-recipients-only program: "If
the [needs] test is included, however, a real threat to the integrity
of the program is posed because a strict 'needs' requirement will
limit benefits of the program to persons already on welfare and

thus be merely an exercise in bookkeeping.159
In addition to the welfare-related problems, there is an additional reason why the compensation program should not include a
needs test: the problem of equitable decisionmaking by administrators. Two New York cases highlight this problem. In one case, a
woman in her late twenties with a good job and no dependents was
151. 1982 ANN. RP., supra note 1, at 10.
152. See supra note 79; 1982 ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 3.
153. McAdam, supra note 19, at 355-56.

154.

FLA. STAT.

155.

Childres, supra note 29, at 462 (emphasis added).

§ 960.02 (1981).

156. Id.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
UNIF. CRIME VicTiMs REPARATIONS ACT § 5(g) comment, 11 U.L.A. 42, 43 (1973).
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not compensated because she had $8000 in savings. But in another
case two elderly women received awards despite their having more
than $18,000 in the bank.16 0 Additionally, innocent crime victims
are not limited to one income group, and certainly "the loss sustained by the rich or middle-class victim is as real as that sustained by the impoverished victim."' 161 Medical expenses, employment disruption, and interference with normal life are universal to
162
all victims.
The needs test has other problems. From a policy perspective, 6 3
it is inconsistent with the theories justifying compensation. If the
applicable justification is the shared risk/insurance rationale, an
act including a financial needs test fails to spread losses but simply
reallocates wealth by limiting eligibility. 164 If a state, like Florida,
uses the moral responsibility theory, why should that responsibility
stop at the poverty line?
Thus, the needs test does nothing to help innocent victims; instead it denies just claims. 65 As one commentator points out:
"Such tests of financial need cannot be justified on either philosophical or practical grounds. There is no denying, however, that
they are politically attractive and in some instances are considered
a concession that must be made to secure passage of victim compensation legislation."' 66
The political realities of the needs test are well demonstrated by
comments such as those from Florida legislator Eric Smith, who
wrote that the Act was "not a giveaway program.' ' 67 In New York
the needs test was rationalized as a reaction by legislators to costs
associated with Medicaid: "[O]ur legislature had already been
H. EDELHERTZ & G. GElS, supra note 7, at 60.
161. Cosway, Crime Compensation, 49 WASH. L. REV. 551, 554 (1974).
162. Id.
163. From a principled perspective, the distinction between those who have financial
need and thus are entitled to compensation and those who are excluded meets constitutional guarantees under the fourteenth amendment. In State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874, 879
(Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court held that "the need limitation is clearly consistent
with standards embodied in a host of. . . public benefit laws, and it is manifestly rational
in relation to the objective of relieving demands on taxpayer-funded assistance programs."
Id.
From a policy perspective, if victim compensation is simply another form of welfare as it
well may be due the financial hardship test, it is especially difficult to understand why crime
victims should be favored over others also in need. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 7,
at 271. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
164. Koning, supra note 22, at 701.
165. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 7, at 271-72.
166. Id. at 271.
167. Smith, A Renewed Concern for the Victim in Florida, 52 FLA. B.J. 16, 18 (1978).
160.
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badly bitten by Medicaid. They were told one thing and when it
got into existence, it blossomed. They treated this [victim compensation] program as another one of those runaways, and that's why
they actually put the serious financial hardship in it."' 68
These political pressures should be overcome. Whatever the savings realized by the financial hardship requirement, they are far
outweighed by the human costs and policy problems associated
with it. Using a means test to eliminate the middle and upper-class
victims exacerbates the victim's plight, adding distrust and alienation, while increasing public confusion by suggesting that awards
are welfare handouts.
There are several potential solutions to this problem. First, Florida could make financial need one factor among many to determine
eligibility. But this compromise would do nothing to eliminate administrative costs or arbitrary decisionmaking by administrators.
Second, lawmakers could fix a percentage or dollar amount of
loss required for those who would not meet the financial hardship
test. Thus, the compensation program would give awards at a certain point so that middle-class claimants would not have to deplete
their savings. This proposal would eliminate the welfare stigma
and meet the policy rationales for compensating victims. But serious problems remain because this proposal would, in effect, bring
in a minimum loss'" 9 requirement for certain financially situated
claimants while doing nothing to alleviate the administrative costs.
Accordingly, the Florida Legislature should follow the continuing recommendation of the BCC and eliminate the financial needs
168. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEis, supra note 7, at 32 (quoting S. Van Rensselaer, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Compensation of the Innocent Victims
of Violent Crime 33 (May 27-29, 1970)).
169. The justification advanced for minimum loss thresholds is that such a requirement
might prevent small claims from being filed which cost more to process than the claim itself.
This argument is weakened by common sense. Since victims are unlikely to understand the
complexities of lost-earnings schedules, it is doubtful that they will know when their loss
would fall below the minimum. Because an initial investigation of all claims must take
place, it is arguable that the claim might as well be approved as denied. More importantly,
since great numbers of claimants suffer small losses, such a threshold would deny these large
number of otherwise eligible victims. Thus, one argument that makes sense for the minimum loss requirement is that it saves pay-out costs. Additionally, such a requirement appears unfair to those who are living at a subsistence level, for whom the small amount may
be substantial. Accordingly, Florida wisely avoided the minimum loss requirement for all
claimants. The proposal suggested in the text would not only undo this good result, but
would add problems because it would only apply the minimum loss to those with financial
means, thus again adding to the alienation of the middle-class victim. For further discussion
of minimum loss requirements, see H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEis, supra note 7, at 283-84; Harland, supra note 46, at 212-14; Comment, supra note 1, at 281-82.
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1 70

requirement.

V.

EXCLUSION BASED ON IMPERMISSIBLE RELATION TO THE
OFFENDER

Another problematic provision of the Act is its exclusion of several classes of claimants because they are impermissibly related to
the offender. These restrictions are not unique; the majority of
compensation programs in existence currently limit awards in this
way.17 The Florida Act denies awards when the claimant "[i]s related within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the
person who committed the crime;... is maintaining a sexual relationship with the person who committed the crime; or ... resides
1' 7
in the same household as the person who committed the crime." '
Before examining the rationales advanced for excluding these
claimants, it is important to note some troublesome statutory ambiguities. Neither the Act nor its implementing rules defines
17
"household," "maintaining a sexual relationship" or "affinity.

Consequently, does the "household" exclusion apply only to those
living together when the crime occurred or also to those who lived
together sometime in the past? The same argument can be made
for the "maintaining a sexual relationship" exclusion. It is unclear,
for example, whether a woman who was assaulted by a former boyfriend would be excluded if their sexual relationship ended the
170. 1982 ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 4.
171. Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 489-90. A few states, such as California and Delaware,
have no ban at all on compensating persons related to the offender. Some states allow compensation "where the interests of justice require." Other states make the victim ineligible if
he or she lives in the same household as the offender and aided or abetted the offender in
the commission of the unlawful act. Id.
172. FLA. STAT. § 960.04(2)(c)-(e) (1981). Prior to 1980 even dependent children of a
deceased victim who were related to the offender were excluded. The legislature amended
the Act so that these victims would no longer be eliminated, but erred in not extending the
amendment to include child abuse victims. Thus, when a father beats his child, but leaves
the mother unharmed, the child is ineligible as a claimant because of the consanguinity and
household exclusions. Needless to say, if the mother is also a victim of abuse, she is excluded from an award for the same reasons.
173. The "affinity" ambiguity has already resulted in litigation. In Ocasio v. Bureau of
Crimes Compensation, 408 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the BCC denied a claim by the
victim because she was still married to her estranged husband at the time he slashed her
face with a razor. The court reversed the BCC's decision, noting, however, that the claimant
had already filed for divorce and was neither living with the offender nor maintaining a
sexual relationship with him. Id. at 752. The court dismissed the BCC's argument that the
legislative intent was to render the Act unavailable to victims who have a personal relationship with their attackers. Instead, the court said such a broad general policy would extend
to ex-spousal relationships, and thus held that the implementation of the exclusions should
be limited to the precise restrictions stated within the Act. Id. at 753.
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previous day.""
These ambiguities are troublesome for reasons other than normal statutory construction issues. Rather, these vague descriptions
are symptomatic of the questionable justifications for requiring
such exclusions. As will be shown in the upcoming analysis of these
justifications, more is at play here than the often-cited desire to
eliminate fraud.
Four rationales are advanced to justify the relational exclusion:
(1) the policy prevents fraud and collusion; (2) the policy prevents
the criminal offender from benefiting from his crime; (3) the policy
to less deserving
saves money; and (4) the policy prevents awards
7
victims who contributed to their victimization.1
The argument that dropping the relational exclusion will result
in fraud due to collusion between the victim and his or her known
offender has little merit. 76 Despite the analogy that cynics make to
the incidents of fraudulent automobile and property insurance
claims, compensation programs in general have been largely free of
fraud. 177 In those states that do not strictly prohibit awards to victims who are within the relational boundaries, the result is the
same. The administrator of Ohio's compensation program noted
that "[tjhe awards rendered in cases where the relational exclusion
17 8
is involved are usually too small to provide incentive for fraud.
Another example comes from the Delaware program's Executive
Secretary: "This agency is well into its ninth year of operation and,
to date, have [sic] not experienced any fraudulent relational type
claims.' 179 The Minnesota program director had a similar response: "Familial or residential relationship does not seem to foster fraudulent claims at any greater rate than other claims. We
find very few cases where we suspect fraud."1 0 A claims adjudicator from the Washington program noted:
174. Suppose the relationship had ended that day? Or a week before? Or a month
before? Should there be a requirement that the person who moved out be gone for a certain
length of time before the victim and the offender are no longer residing in the same
household?
175. Koning, supra note 22, at 705.

176. Id.
177. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEis, supra note 7, at 279-81.
178. Letter from David Zwyer, Administrative Assistant, Victim Compensation Program,
Ohio (Jan. 18, 1983).
179. Letter from Oakley Banning, Jr., Executive Secretary, Delaware Violent Crimes
Compensation Board (Jan. 13, 1983).
180. Letter from David Woodworth, Executive Director, Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board (Jan. 21, 1983).
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Out of the approximate 8,000 application[s] we have received
during the life of the crime victim program, we have only been
able to detect that approximately 4 or 5 were fraudulent....
[C]laims that have fallen within the domestic violence exception
• . . have not included any of the 4 or 5 fraudulent claims." 1
Second, the Act itself works to check fraud. The legislation contains stringent provisions against fraudulent compensation
awards. 82 More importantly, the Act requires that the crime be
properly reported within seventy-two hours after its occurrence. 183
The BCC may reduce, deny, or withdraw any award if the claimant
84
has not "duly cooperated" with all law enforcement officials.1
A problem exists here because, although a high percentage of
claimants are denied awards because of noncooperation with law
enforcement agencies, 8 5 the required "cooperation" is not defined
in the Act or its implementing rules. 186 This ambiguity should be
resolved so that cooperation requirements are made known to
claimants upon application for awards. 8 7 Legislators would thus be
reassured that even relational claims would be free from fraud because offenders would know that the price of collecting an award
would be high: reporting and subsequent cooperation that could
lead to a relative's incarceration.
181. Letter from Brian Huseby, Claims Adjudicator, Washington Crime Victim Compensation Section, Department of Labor and Industries (Jan. 17, 1983). Huseby defined fraudulent claims as those which involve "knowing lies as opposed to embellishing one's innocence
during the activities leading to an assault." Id.
182. FLA. STAT. § 960.18 (1981). The Act states that any person who procures compensation by fraud or helps or counsels another person to get compensation by fraud will be
guilty of a felony of the third degree. Id.
183. FLA. STAT. § 960.13(1)(b) (1981).
184. Id.
185. The 1978 Annual Report shows that 32 out of 265 claimants were denied compensation because they didn't cooperate with law enforcement officials. 1978 FLA. BuREAU OF
CRIMES COMPENSATION ANN. REP. 12. In 1979, the figure was 97 out of 1143. 1979 FLA. BuREAU OF CRIMES COMPENSATION ANN. REP. 17. In 1980, 205 out of 1252 were denied awards
for noncooperation. 1980 FLA. BuREAU OF CRIMES COMPENSATION ANN. REP. 24. In 1981, 131
out of 1159 claimants were denied for that reason. 1981 FLA. BUREAU OF CRIMES COMPENSATION ANN. REP. 24. Although claims are frequently denied for more than one reason and
thus these figures are not dispositive, the fact remains that noncooperation with law enforcement is one of the most often-cited reasons for claim denial. It should be noted that a
lack of serious financial hardship is often the most cited reason for the denial of
compensation.
186. For example, if a claimant misses one or two appointments with police after months
of cooperation, has the claimant lost the right to receive compensation?

187.

The BCC has interpreted the "cooperation" language of the statute to include

pressing charges, giving depositions, appearing at lineups, and testifying at trial if need be.
Telephone interview with Herb Parker, Executive Director, BCC (January 30, 1983).
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There are additional provisions within the Act that protect
against fraud. Like the majority of other states,88 Florida limits
awards to reimbursement for actual losses sustained by physical
injury or death.189 The unreimbursed losses must come from medical treatment and be documented. 190 The possibilities for fraud are
limited to the few people who have no medical insurance, could
beat a financial hardship test, would risk the statutory penalties
for fraud and, finally, would be willing to sustain injuries serious
enough to require medical attention. There must be easier ways to
make money. 191
Another rationale justifying relational exclusions is a desire to
prevent "unjust enrichment" by an offender who, for example,
beats his wife and then tries to collect for her injuries. 92 This argument fails, however, because an offender does not profit when
the cost of an award includes the claimant's reporting the crime,
subsequent prosecution, cooperation, and the offender's potential
conviction.
Additionally, the focus on the criminal offender is misplaced; the
purpose of the Act is to aid victims. Even if the offender receives
some benefit, such as being relieved from the responsibility of paying a battered spouse's medical bills, 93 it is arguable that as long
as some of the award aids the victim, then the legislative policy is
well-served.
Those uncomfortable with compensation being denied to some
victims because an offender might also receive some benefit, but
who are unwilling to eliminate the relational exclusion, should be
satisfied by the UCVRA's solution. The drafters of the UCVRA
abandoned the strict relational exclusion in favor of more flexibility. Instead of totally banning compensation to victims who are
related to criminal offenders, the UCVRA denies awards only if the
188. Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 491. Only a few states compensate for pain and suffering
or mental and nervous shock. Id. at 492.
189. FLA. STAT. § 960.03(8) (1981). The Act compensates for out-of-pocket losses which
"means unreimbursed and unreimbursable expenses or indebtedness incurred for medical
care, nonmedical remedial care, or other treatment rendered in accordance with a religious
method of healing or for other services necessary as a result of the injury or death upon
which such claim is based." Id.
190. FLA. STAT. § 960.06(e) (1981).
191. Koning, supra note 22, at 706. For example, an individual who sought to defraud
the program because he was within a relational exclusion could always blame an imaginary
stranger for his injuries. Id.
192. See Brooks, How Well Are Criminal Injury Compensation ProgramsPerforming?,
21 CRiMz & DELINQ. 50, 54 (1975).
193. Letter, supra note 180.
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payment would unjustly benefit the offender. 1 4 Although the UCVRA's addendum creates a presumption of unjust benefits in certain situations, the compensation board still has the option of
awarding benefits when "the interests of justice otherwise require." 195 This flexible approach eliminates Florida's current inequity which allows victims of strangers to receive compensation
while victims impermissibly related to their attacker are denied recovery, even though injury and loss occurred in both cases. Not
only does this flexible approach make sense theoretically, but it
works in practice as well.
For example, in Minnesota1 " the "interest of justice clause" operates so that incest cases are "almost always paid mainly because
there is almost always a prosecution, and the home situation is
changed to avoid future incidents. 1 97 Additionally,
[hiusband-wife cases are paid where steps are taken to alleviate
the situation, i.e., prosecution, divorce, restraining orders, etc.
The ultimate question is not one of avoiding fraud, but of avoiding financial benefits to the assailant, e.g. [tihe battering husband
is responsible for the battered wife's medical bills. The Board will
not help both of them if they stay together and there is no prosecution. However, if she prosecutes, and attempts to remove herself from the bad situation, the Board will help her financially. 159
Washington uses a more restrictive approach; the statute absolutely bans compensating victims who are married or related by
blood to the offender and living in the same household. 99 Thus,
the Washington act's "interest of justice" clause looks at whether
provocation occurred where an estranged spouse is injured by the
other. 00 Additionally, the Washington use of the "interest of jus194.

UNIt. CRIME REPARxTIONs AcT § 5(c), 11 U.L.A. 42 (1973); Koning, supra note 22, at

706.
195. UNIF. CRIME REPARATIONS AcT § 5(c) comment, 11 U.L.A. 43 (1973).
196. The Minnesota statute states that no awards will be given if "the victim is the
spouse of or a person living in the same household with the offender or his accomplice or the
parent, child, brother, or sister of the offender or his accomplice unless the board determined that the interests of justice otherwise require in a particular case." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 299B.03(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983).
197. Letter, supra note 180.
198. Id.
199. WASH. Rsv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.070(3)(b), (c)(i)-(ii) (1981).
200. Letter, supra note 181. The result would be the same in Florida. See Ocasio v.
Bureau of Crimes Compensation, 408 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (estranged wife of
assailant compensated because she was neither living with nor maintaining a sexual relationship with the offender).
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tice" clause also allows compensation for unmarried persons not
cohabitating who are maintaining a sexual relationship and for
those with a blood-relationship not living in the same household.
Ohio has the most expansive "interest of justice" clause, 01 employing detailed criteria to determine when relational claimants
should receive compensation. 02 A few case examples illustrate the
use of these criteria. Compensation was allowed for an offender's
brother living with the offender by reason of a court order when
the assault occurred. 0 3 Yet a victim shot by her husband after being caught committing adultery was not compensated, the commissioner reasoning that the victim had violated her marital
contract. 04
Especially striking, however, is the criteria's application when
there has been a history of domestic violence. In In Re Taylor,'0 5 a
claims commissioner initially denied compensation for a victim assaulted by her husband because the record showed a pattern of
domestic violence. The husband committed suicide after his assault.'" This decision was reversed by a three-commissioner panel
201.

OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

§ 2743.60(B) (Page 1981).

202. In Re Application of Wilma Jean Taylor, Claim No. V 80-42589 (Ohio Ct. of Claims
May 28, 1981).
1) Is there possibility of fraud and collusion between offender and the Applicant or the victim?
a) Was there an injury?
b) Did the Applicant cooperate with the police?
c) Was the crime reported within seventy-two (72) hours?
2) Will there be a direct or indirect benefit to the offender that would encourage offenders to engage in criminally injurious conduct?
a) Will the offender personally profit from an award?
b) Will the offender be relieved of an obligation of support if an award
is made?
3) Are there present any of the elements of domestic violence that would make
it difficult to allocate ultimate fault to the victim or the offender?
a) How closely are victim and the offender related?
b) Was the victim guilty of contributory misconduct?
c) If not guilty of contributory misconduct, did the victim or Applicant
still share in the ultimate blame for causing injuries?
d) Is there a history of conflict between the offender or the victim and a
family member?
4) Is the Applicant in that class of wholly innocent persons who should not be
excluded from a reparations award?
a) Is the Applicant a minor dependent child?
b) Is the Applicant capable of self-support?
Id.
203. In Re Wood, Claim No. V 80-31854sc (Ohio Ct. of Claims Dec. 16, 1980).
204. In Re Mowery, Claim No. V 80-36082sc (Ohio Ct. of Claims June 2, 1981).
205. See supra note 202.
206. The commissioner noted that the applicant had been threatened with bodily harm
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which stated:
[T]he single commissioner has focused upon the Applicant's toleration of the assailant's abusive behavior and that he considered
this toleration to constitute fault on the part of the Applicant.
The single commissioner would thus require victims in every such
situation to take affirmative steps to protect themselves from a
relative or fellow household resident who has shown that he is
ready, willing, and able to inflict harm upon them....
Toleration of abuse falls within the realm of social judgments,
but,. . . we do not consider it an appropriate standard of denial.
It would be misguided to penalize the Applicant for tolerating
physical or verbal abuse in a marital situation where she did not
provoke or incite it. Many individuals, especially women, must
tolerate abuse because of life-long economic dependency, love of
fear of retrichildren, love of spouse despite his misbehavior, and
20
bution if the victim were to take protective action.

7

The Ohio commissioners concluded that the Taylor victim
should receive an award because there was no evidence showing
she instigated the argument that led to her injuries.
The detailed investigation involved and the resulting expense is
another rationale advanced for denying relational victims compensation.'10 This argument has merit, but it is insufficient alone to
justify barring these victims from compensation because it fails to
recognize that the same costly examination of victim provocation is
also made in other situations. For example, in a- bar fight among
friends, acquaintances, or even strangers, the investigator must
still determine whether the victim contributed to his injuries.20
Thus, excluding relational claims comes from a belief that these
victims are not truly innocent and that therefore the state has no
moral responsibility to help them. But while public awareness of
rape has diminished the idea that rape victims "ask for it," there
persists a belief that women beaten by their husbands "must have
numerous times and had also previously been beaten. The commissioner thus concluded
that the applicant's conduct in remaining with the offender, while not contributory misconduct, still was a major factor resulting in her injuries. Id.
207. In Re Application of Wilma Jean Taylor, Claim No. V 80-42589 (Ohio Ct. of Claims
May 28, 1981).
208. H. EDELHERTZ & G. Gess, supra note 7, at 269.
209. The Ohio administrator estimates that "[t]here are no additional burdens or cost
from our perspective in these [relational] cases because the only real in-depth investigations
are done by the local police departments." Letter, supra note 178.
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done something terrible" to provoke the attack.2 ' 0 Thus, relational
exclusions cut costs by denying what some perceive to be as less
deserving victims.2 ' This moralistic judgment has no place in a
program whose purpose is to help victims recover from their injuries. Indeed the relational exclusion is like the financial needs requirement in that it leads to a double-victimization.
Another monetary argument used to deny relational claims
comes from the public's and legislatures' perceptions that a high
proportion of violent crimes occurs in domestic settings.2 2 Even
assuming this perception is accurate, undoubtedly vast numbers of
these crimes go unreported and unprosecuted. 15 Therefore, these
victims would be excluded from awards even if the restriction was
eliminated. 1 4
But another factor may figure into the decision by legislators to
exclude relational claims. Allowance of such claims would force administrators to deal with repetitive and complex situations which
are highly intrusive into family life. Although studies show that
family violence is often repetitive, 15 states allowing compensation
for relational victims "where the interest of justice allows" report
no such problems.21 6 One administrator noted:
210. Koning, supra note 22, at 707.
211. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 7, at 269.
212. This perception is somewhat distorted because the Department of Justice estimates
that less than 10% of all aggravated assaults are inflicted upon relatives. 1977 U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 334-35.
213. M. Roy, BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 65
(1977) (only one out of 270 incidents of spouse abuse are ever reported).
214. As the Executive Secretary of the Delaware program noted: "In most of the cases
we receive involving adult relational type crimes, we find that the victim does not desire to
prosecute the defendant and, therefore, the Board has no choice but to deny the application
due to lack of cooperation with the law enforcement authorities." Letter, supra note 179. It
is arguable that should the relational exclusion be eliminated more victims of domestic violence would report and prosecute, thus adding greatly to the numbers of eligible claimants.
But this has not been the case in states which allow compensation for such relational victims under "interest of justice" clauses. In Delaware, the Executive Secretary estimates that
approximately 5% to 8% of all claims received resulted from relational crimes, a figure
which includes unmarried couples living together. Id. In Washington, out of 8,000 applications, only 10 or 12 have been compensated as falling within the exceptions allowed for
relational claimants. See Letter, supra note 181.
215. In general, once a wife has been hit, it is likely to recur. M. Roy, supra note 213, at
59.
216. The claims adjudicator from Washington states that "[i]f we were to receive a second application from a victim whose injury occurred under the same circumstances as the
first injury, we would be unlikely to deny the second application." Letter, supra note 181.
Additionally, the Delaware administrator wrote: "With repeat claims, especially relational
cases, the Board must take a hard look upon [sic] this situation. I might add that the majority would be denied or diminished." Letter, supra note 179.
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Repeat claimants are rare, whether involving the relational exclusion or not. A claim which is filed where there has been a pattern
of domestic violence will probably be denied because the claimant
did not remove themselves [sic] (or at least make an attempt to
remove themselves) from a situation where personal injury was
likely. Because repeat situations look suspicious, they will be
scrutinized more closely both during the investigation and in
217
weighing the evidence.
The examples from states allowing compensation for relational
claimants "in the interest of justice" show that compensation is
made to innocent claimants willing to act to prevent future victimization.2 1 This is basically the same standard used in non-relational cases where Florida denies compensation if the claimant
"contributed to the infliction of his injury or death. '219
No valid reason exists to exclude these claimants. The fear of
fraud, collusion, or indirect benefit is mooted by the Act's requirement of reporting and cooperation. Additionally, administrative or
payment costs saved by the exclusion are outweighed by benefitting a broader class of innocent victims. Information from other
states also demonstrates that relational claims can be handled administratively. Thus, the legislature should eliminate the relational
exclusion and replace it with the "interest of justice" clause, supplemented by guidelines similar to those operating in Ohio.'" 0
The question remains of where additional revenue, if needed,
will come from should the legislature scrap the financial hardship
test and the strict relational exclusion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Several possibilities exist for funding should additional claimants become eligible. The least attractive choice involves raising no
more money, but rather reducing the award to a fixed percentage.
For example, claims might be funded at 80% of what is needed to
compensate for out-of-pocket expenses. This proposal's advantage
is compensation for more innocent victims without necessitating
funding increases. The percentage of need funded could be adjusted upwards should other money such as federal funds become
available. Arguably, this arrangement is consistent with the Act;
217.
218.

Letter, supra note 178.
See supra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.

219.

FLA. STAT.

220.

See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.

§ 960.13(6) (1981).
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since some types of losses are not currently compensable,
lawmakers never intended to restore the claimant financially to
pre-victim status. The disadvantage to this proposal is that the
victim needs all the compensation possible to help restore
normalcy.
The best solution to the funding problem involves a combination
of proposals. First, the legislature should increase the amount of
money that offenders pay in court costs and fine surcharges. While
lawmakers are to be commended for raising the court costs from
ten to fifteen dollars, raising bailbonds from 5% to 10% is well
within the requirements imposed by other states. This additional
increase should withstand constitutional attack. In upholding the
Act, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the current costs and
surcharges were valid because they were neither excessive nor
harsh, nor were they "plainly and undoubtedly in excess of any
reasonable requirements for redressing the wrong."2 2' 1 The proposed increases should easily fall within this standard and pass
constitutional muster. This proposal's advantage is that revenues
should increase greatly. As the assistant attorney general who
works with the Tennessee program stated, "[tlaxing every criminal
offender would be the best answer. We would be awash in money if
' 22 2
we could tax them all.
The legislature should also enact a law structuring cooperation
between the BCC, the Parole and Probation Commission, and the
Office of the State Attorney to insure that more money comes into
the fund from the debt payback of the criminal offender.
At present, there is no such coordination. It is therefore possible
or probable that the sentencing judge is unaware that an award
has been made by the Bureau and thus does not consider requiring
the debt payback as a condition of probation. Requiring the BCC
to notify the state attorney who would then notify the court of
such an award could increase the amount of money paid into the
fund. This is not always possible though. Because victims have up
to a year in which to file a claim, the offender might have already
appeared before the court prior to an award being made. Requiring
the BCC to notify the Parole and Probation Commission of an
award could also increase the fund's revenues because then the offender's repayment of the debt might be more seriously considered
221. State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874, 880 (Fla. 1978) (quoting Amos v. Gunn, 94 So.
615, 641 (Fla. 1922)).
222. Hoelzel, supra note 2, at 493.
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by the Parole Commission at parole time. While offender debt payment will never account for a majority of the money going into the
trust fund for the same reason that restitution is an inadequate
substitution for compensation plans, the current situation, in
which offender repayment accounted for only $50,000 out of the $6
million collected in the last four years, 2 can stand improvement.
In conclusion, the Florida Act is a significant first step in giving
recovery for innocent victims of violent crimes. It is now time for
the legislature to take the next step by eliminating the financial
hardship requirement and replacing the relational exclusion with
the flexible standard previously mentioned. With the history of
other compensation programs before them, the Florida Legislature
should be satisfied that the above-mentioned changes are not only
workable but required if the Act is to meet its promise to help
innocent victims of violent crime.

223.

1981 FLA. BumAu OF CRIMES COMPENSATION ANN. RE. 20-21.

